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Abstract 
 
All too often, asset markets’ imperfections raise borrowing constraints that young 
people face when they contract loans. The distortions to the allocation of resources 
that debt constraints cause have led to the intervention of the public sector in an 
attempt to apply an intergenerational transfer policy that will mitigate them. Social 
security is such a policy which affects incentives to save and educate thus affecting 
welfare and growth.  However, in the presence of a social security policy borrowing 
constraints arise endogenously as an outcome of rationality constraints. In this thesis, 
I examine the impact of a social security policy on the long-run growth employing 
two different pension schemes (unfunded and fully funded) and directly comparing 
results that arise from exogenous and endogenous borrowing constraints setup. Under 
parametric analysis some results are vague and for this reason a numerical analysis 
becomes necessary.  
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1. Introduction 
 
    Since the emergence of New Growth Theory in the 1980’s human capital has 
played a primal role to the development of macroeconomic models, considered as a 
source of growth. Human capital production requires, among others, investment in 
human capital (education). However, asset markets’ imperfections raise borrowing 
constraints that young people face when they contract loans. These constraints arise 
due to the inalienability of human capital and the limited punishments that creditors 
are able to impose on those who default. In general, credit constraints have been for a 
long time concern for policy makers and economic analysts as they crucially affect 
individuals’ welfare and growth. More precisely, borrowing constraints are viewed as 
an obstacle to an efficient allocation of resources throughout the lifetime. The 
deviation of the complete market allocation and the resulted distortion of the 
individual saving behavior affect aggregate savings (physical capital accumulation) 
and the incentives to educate (human capital accumulation) which in turn affect 
growth. 
    The distortions that debt constraints cause have led to the intervention of the public 
sector in an attempt to apply an intergenerational transfer policy that will mitigate 
them. Social security is such a policy which affects incentives to save and educate 
thus affecting welfare and growth.  However, in the presence of a social security 
policy borrowing constraints arise endogenously as an outcome of rationality 
constraints. In other words, creditors will lend up to the point that agents do not have 
incentive to default. This point is crucially determined by the social security tax rate.  
    To the best of my knowledge, there is no study directly addressing the effects of a 
social security program on growth when there are debt constraints in human capital 
investment. Consequently, in this thesis I focus on an economy with only human 
capital production and examine the impact of a social security policy on the long-run 
growth.  I employ two different pension schemes; a pay-as-you-go (unfunded) and a 
fully funded program both financed by a payroll proportional tax. Under parametric 
analysis some results are vague and for this reason a numerical analysis becomes 
necessary.  
    The thesis is organized as follows. In section 2, I make a brief literature review. In 
section 3, I present the benchmark model used in the rest of my thesis. In the same 
section I also present the setup of borrowing constraints and the two social security 
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schemes. Section 4 describes the equilibrium of an unconstrained economy and 
economies with binding borrowing constraints. I then make comparative statics 
analysis and examine the effects of unfunded and fully funded social security on the 
equilibrium and long-run growth.  In section 5, I calibrate the model and derive more 
explicit results through numerical analysis. Finally, in the last section I draw some 
basic conclusions. 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
    Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) were among the first to emphasize the role of 
human capital investment as the engine of growth. Since then many papers have been 
written exploring the human capital effects on basic economic variables. However, as 
mentioned before human capital investment is hindered by asset markets’ 
imperfections in the form of liquidity constraints that young people face. Among the 
first that introduced exogenous liquidity constraints were Hubbard and Judd (1987). 
Aiyagari (1994) also built a growth model modified to include uninsured idiosyncratic 
risk and a “fixed” (exogenously determined) limit up to which agents can borrow. 
Exogenous debt constraints were then used for analyzing the effects on growth. In the 
seminal paper of Japelli and Pagano (1994) cross-country regressions showed that 
liquidity constraints on households raise the saving rate thus inducing physical capital 
accumulation and increasing growth. However, when there is human capital 
production the effects of liquidity constraints do not end with the effects on savings. 
There is also a detrimental impact of debt constraints on human capital production 
and thus on growth. Among the first to study the above effect were Buiter and Kletzer 
(1995) who assumed that agents are self-financed for their training costs. Assuming 
that young individuals make a trade-off between working and studying, De Gregorio 
(1996) concludes that the inability of the young to borrow against future income 
reduces the incentives for human capital accumulation thus reducing growth. Christou 
(1993) develops a neoclassical growth model with borrowing constraints and obtains 
similar results by simulating the model. Hence, in a model with human capital there 
are two opposite effects of debt constraints on growth; the subsequent beneficial 
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increase in aggregate savings and the detrimental hindrance of human capital 
accumulation.  
    As noted before, a government policy could alleviate the harmful effects of 
borrowing constraints on welfare and growth. This policy would be ideal if the 
allocation of resources in a debt-constrained economy could be the same as the 
allocation obtained with complete markets. Rangel (2003) and Boldrin and Montes 
(2005) show that a policy with joint provision of public education and social security 
can generate such a complete market allocation. However, the borrowing constraints 
are no longer exogenous if we deviate from the laiser-faire economy. The interaction 
between borrowing constraints and economic policy seems to be more complicate 
since borrowing constraints arise endogenously as a result of the economic policy.  
For instance, the level of education or social security tax affect the incentives for the 
borrowers to default thus making debt constraints bind more or less tightly. 
Endogenous constraints have been developed in various ways but the most prevalent 
setup until now is that of Kehoe and Levine (1993). The authors introduce 
endogeneity in the form of individual rationality constraints assuming that upon 
default agents are excluded from future asset market trading and their assets are 
seized.  
    Following the above setup of endogenous constraints that arise as a result of 
government policy, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002) simulate a model and study 
the accumulation of human capital. They conclude that individual default costs vary 
(i) across the population, (ii) over the life cycle and (iii) by the government policy. 
Increasing education subsidies should be accompanied by more extensive loan 
programs. In contrast to exogenous debt constraints models, their model predicts 
greater human capital investment for any level of observable debt and smaller impact 
from a wage tax on human capital investment.  
    Andolfatto and Gervais (2006) also employ Kehoe and Levine’s setup for 
endogenous constraints and apply the government policy suggested by Boldrin and 
Montes (2005). The authors conclude that endogenous constraints can generate 
multiple equilibria. Specifically, when endogenous human capital formation interacts 
with endogenous debt constraints the constraint set becomes non-convex. This means 
that for a given level of policy intervention there exist more than one optimal levels of 
human capital investment. Hence, ex ante identical individuals may exhibit ex post 
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heterogeneity. However, by assuming proportional rather than lump-sum tax I show 
that this result is not guaranteed.  
    So far, existing literature has studied the effects of borrowing constraints in a 
partial equilibrium framework. De la Croix and Michel (2007) extend to a general 
equilibrium model assuming that endogenous constraints arise as a result of the 
interest rate and they examine how debt limits on education funding affect growth. 
The authors show that too low and too high interest rates increase the incentives to 
default thus harming growth. They also conclude that multiplicity of equilibria arises 
and that the growth maximum may be attained in equilibrium where debt constraints 
bind. In other words, countries with relatively weak financial market can exhibit 
higher growth only if the elasticity of human capital to education is sufficiently high. 
This last result contradicts to former studies defending that financial deepening leads 
monotonically to higher long-run growth. The results in this thesis support the latter 
studies. 
    As noted above, the state intervention is desirable especially when the attained 
competitive equilibria are inefficient or they do not achieve the maximum of certain 
goals related to welfare and growth. However, the causality between government 
policies and liquidity constraints is bidirectional (reciprocal). Not only can a state 
policy change the effects of borrowing constraints but also credit constraints affect the 
efficiency of such policies. A first attempt to examine the interaction between 
liquidity constraints and social security was made by Hubbard and Judd (1985) who 
studied the welfare implications of a social security program in a life-cycle economy. 
Andolfatto and Gervais (2008) investigate whether the welfare implications of a 
social security policy are sensitive to the specification of the borrowing constraint. 
For this reason the authors compare welfare effects resulting from models with 
exogenous and endogenous constraints. They conclude that exogenous constraints are 
adequately appropriate for modeling such an economy if we focus only on the 
aggregate impact of social security and not on the heterogeneous effects at the 
individual level.   
    Apart from welfare implications, social security policy can affect growth. For 
instance, a pay-as-you-go (unfunded) pension scheme has been criticized as 
detrimental to growth since it discourages private saving and physical capital 
accumulation (Feldstein (1974)). An extra channel that such a policy affects growth is 
through the decision for education and human capital accumulation (Lambrecht, 
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Michel and Vidal (2005), Docquier and Paddison (2003)). Since social security 
benefits enjoyed by a generation depend on the income (human capital) of the same or 
the next generation, individuals are encouraged to invest in human capital production. 
However, their optimal choice for investment may be hindered by borrowing 
constraints. A suboptimal level of human capital investment not only reduces welfare 
but also harms growth. In the next sections I show that the interaction between 
borrowing constraints and social security results to non-trivial effects on human 
capital accumulation and long-run growth.   
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3. The Benchmark Model 
 
3.1 Preliminaries 
    Our model depicts a small open economy consisting of individuals, firms and the 
government. Individuals invest time and resources in human capital production in 
order to accumulate wealth and consume it afterwards. In our model there is no 
physical capital production neither physical capital as input, since we focus on the 
role of human capital as the engine of growth.  
 
 
3.2 Individuals 
    We employ an overlapping generations framework with identical individuals who 
live for three periods; youth, middle age and retirement age. The generation born at t 
period consists of Nt individuals and the population of generations increases at a 
constant rate n. An agent born at t period draws utility according to the following 
utility function: 
 
2,21,12,21,1 lnln)1ln(),,( ++++ ++−= tttttt ccecceu  
 
    The agents draw utility from consumption during the middle and old age (c1, c2 
respectively) and there is also a disutility term resulted from the time devoted to 
education et during the young age. For simplistic reasons, we drop the utility term 
regarding the consumption when young since it does not alter our qualitative results. 
    When young, individuals allocate their time between education and leisure, and 
borrow with the aid of a financial market. Under the assumption of partial equilibrium 
and a small open economy the interest rate r with which individuals borrow is 
exogenously determined. Finally, throughout our analysis we assume that the interest 
rate is invariant to time and always higher than the population growth rate in order to 
guarantee dynamic efficiency. When middle-aged, individuals supply labor 
inelastically and earn the return to human capital according to a production process. 
Middle-aged individuals have to pay off their loans, pay a social security tax and 
allocate the rest of their earnings between current consumption and savings for future 
consumption. Finally, the old retire and consume their savings and the social security 
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benefits. The pay-roll tax is proportional and the social security benefits are 
distributed in a lump-sum way. Above all, the individuals face the following 
constraints: 
 
   
 
where  
s1,s2 = savings during the first and second stage of life 
q = education expenditure (borrowing) when young 
w = labor wage 
τ = social security tax rate 
b = social security benefits 
h = units of efficient labor (private human capital) 
 
    Human capital is produced only if both time and resources are devoted to 
investment in education. Individuals, when young, also can pick up a fraction 
]1,0[∈v of the existing average level of human capital Ht, without effort, simply by 
observing what the previous generation does. That is the human capital production is 
described by the following function: 
 
tttt qeHvh ⋅⋅+⋅=+ ϕ1    ,   v, φ > 0      (4) 
 
 
 
3.3 Firms  
    There is a single good in the economy produced by firms that employ only efficient 
labor as an input. The production process is described by the following production 
function 
Y = AHt   ,       A>0       
 
)3()1(
)2()1()w1(
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where Ht is the total units of efficient labor (aggregate/average human capital)1. 
Profit maximizing implies that the wage per unit of efficient labor is wt = A  t∀ . 
 
 
3.4 The Government 
    Household liquidity constraints are market imperfections that justify state 
intervention. In the present model the government intervenes applying a social 
security scheme under which the state levy pay-roll taxes from middle-aged 
individuals and allocate them to the old. We also assume that the tax rate is 
proportional and constant in time, and the social security benefits are distributed in a 
lump-sum way. At first glance, the introduction of social security does not make sense 
since people do have access to a financial market in order to save and transfer 
resources from the second to the third stage of life or reversely. Furthermore, there is 
no physical capital in order for a social security to affect savings and in turn growth. 
However, in a model with human capital, a social security tax can modify the 
incentives to invest in human capital thus affecting growth.2 We focus on two basic 
pension schemes; unfunded (pay-as-you-go) and fully funded scheme. By introducing 
human capital, both schemes can affect capital accumulation thus growth, in contrast 
to models with only physical capital where a fully funded scheme is neutral. 
 
3.4.1 Unfunded (Pay-As-You-Go) pension system 
    According to the unfunded program, the taxes levied from a generation (middle-
aged) are distributed to the previous generation (old-aged) at the same period so that 
the government’s budget is always balanced every period of time. 
 
tttttttttt hwnbhwNbNTG ⋅⋅+=⇒⋅⋅=⋅⇒= −− ττ )1(12          (5) 
 
where  
G = total government spending 
T = total tax revenue 
                                                 
1
 We normalize the population to 1. 
2
 Social security is also analyzed in models with heterogeneous agents when the government aims at 
distributional effects. (Kaganovich and Zilcha (2008), Docquier and Paddison (2003)) 
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3.4.2 Fully funded pension system        
    In a fully funded system, the taxes levied from a generation (middle-aged) are 
distributed to the same generation at the next period so that the government’s budget 
remains balanced: 
 
1111221 )1()1()1( −−−−−−+ ⋅⋅+=⇒⋅⋅⋅+=⋅⇒⋅+= tttttttttt hwrbhwNrbNTrG ττ      (6) 
 
 
3.5 Debt constraints setup 
    Young people often do not have either own resources or parental financial aid for 
their education funding and they resort to contract a loan which they have to pay off 
when making wealth. We assume an economy with capital market imperfections 
which take the form of inability to borrow against future wage income.  Capital 
market imperfections may arise due to two reasons. The first reason is the high costs 
for enforcing loan repayment due to bankruptcy laws and other legal protections 
afforded to debtors. Secondly, adverse selection effects can prevent the regular 
operation of credit markets. We focus on two different kinds of constraints depending 
on the mechanism that can guarantee the loan repayment; exogenous and endogenous 
constraints. 
    Quite interesting is also the case that the middle-aged find themselves debt-
constrained. This is the case when social security benefits are extremely high in 
contrast with the few resources left for consumption when middle-aged. In an attempt 
to transfer resources back to their middle age and smooth their consumption in a 
better way, agents may become debt-constrained. However, this scenario is out of our 
scope and for this reason we assume that the savings in the middle age are always 
non-negative. 
 
 
3.5.1 Exogenous constraints  
    Exogenous debt constraints are considered as an upper limit that the young face 
when borrowing. This limit is exogenously determined and taken as given in the 
optimization problem.  
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    We follow De Gregorio (1996) for the setup of an exogenous debt constraint but in 
a slightly different way. Since young do not work, their borrowing limit is considered 
as a fraction of the current income (average level of human capital) that previous 
generation hold: 
ttt Hwq ⋅≤ θ         (7) 
where ].1,0[∈θ  
 
 
3.5.2 Endogenous constraints 
 
    Exogenous borrowing constraints though easy to handle, they do not seem realistic 
and cannot capture every aspect of a borrowing behavior. In the real world, there is no 
a mechanism that can guarantee the repayment of a loan. For this reason, creditors 
will lend up to the point that the act of default is costly in terms of welfare. The 
default penalties can affect the cost of defaulting thus preventing it. The most 
prevalent penalties for a defaulter are her permanent or temporary exclusion from the 
financial market or/and the garnishment of fraction of her income. We follow Kehoe, 
Levine (1993, 2000) in the setup of the endogenous constraints, assuming that 
defaulters are permanently excluded from the financial market. That is, private 
creditors are able to garnishee 100% of any future savings planned by individuals thus 
making the act of default irrational. However, a crucial assumption is that creditors 
cannot garnishee social security benefits. In this setup, there are two individual 
rationality constraints (IRC); constraint (8) dictates that an individual will not default 
if the welfare drawn by consumption allocation upon default (right-hand side) is lower 
than the welfare enjoyed by consumption allocation without default (left-hand side). 
Constraint (9) implies that the savings when middle-aged must be positive, that is 
there is only possibility to transfer resources from the middle age to the old and not 
reversely.  
 
)9(00
)8(ln])1ln[(lnln
22,21,2
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4.  Equilibrium and growth effects 
 
    Firstly, we are going to define the competitive equilibrium that is the general 
solution to the problems that individuals, firms and the government face.  
 
Definition 1 
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a sequence of prices ∞=0}{ ttw , a sequence 
of allocations ∞=021 },,,{ ttttt ccqe  and a sequence of human capital stock 
0,}{ 00 >∞= HH tt , such that given the population growth n, the constant and 
internationally determined interest rate r, the constant tax rate τ , and the social 
security benefits b, individuals’  utility is maximized, firms’ profits are maximized and 
the government’s budget is satisfied.    ■ 
 
    Secondly, since individuals are identical, in equilibrium the average human capital 
stock equals to the individual human capital stock. That is, we have: 
 
tt Hh =    (10) 
 
At this point we can proceed to the solution of each case that can arise from the 
combination of the debt constraints and the social security programs. 
 
 
4.1 No (or not binding) debt constraints 
Profits’ maximization problem requires that: 
 
tAwt ∀=     (11) 
 
Substituting the human capital equation (4) and (11) into constraint (2) and combining 
the constraints (1), (2) and (3) we take the lifetime budget constraint that an individual 
faces: 
2
2t
2
21
)1(1
)H)A(1(
)1(1 r
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r
qev
r
c
r
c t
t
tttt
+
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=
+
+
+
+++ φτ
        (B.C.) 
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To mention that we consider the budget constraint as binding throughout the thesis. 
When there are no borrowing constraints or they simply do not bind, individuals find 
optimal allocations of ∞=021 },,,{ ttttt ccqe  so as to maximize their utility subject to the 
budget constraint. 
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The first order conditions related to the above maximization problem are: 
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Directly from (12b) we obtain the optimal time spend on education: 
 
)a13(
A)1(
1 * teret ∀=⋅⋅−
+
=
φτ
 
 
Combining (BC), (12c), (12d) and (13a) we take: 
)13(
1
H)A1(
2
1 2
t1,1 b
r
b
vc tt 



+
+−= ++ τ  
Substituting (13b) in (12c) and then (12c) in (12a) we take: 
)13(
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At this point we should discriminate two different solutions according to the two 
different social security programs. 
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4.1.1 Unfunded pension system 
Making use of eq.(4), (5) and (10) in eq.(13c) we derive the optimal education 
expenditure:  
)a14(
r1n)τ(1
τ-1
τ)-(1A)(1 ttt H
v
vqBq ⋅





+
+
+
−⋅=+ τ  
where 
                         
 v
rB −
+
+−−
=
n)1(
)]1(τ)A-)[(11(2)(
τ
φτ
τ  
 
Having determined the optimal time and expenditure devoted to education, we can 
derive the optimal consumption paths from the equations below: 
 
 
 
 
     Note that the optimal time spent on education (eq.13a) is a stationary allocation 
chosen by every generation. The positive relation between the tax rate and the time 
devoted to education is obvious; an increase in the tax rate depresses after-tax income 
thus inducing agents to invest more in human capital production increasing time 
devoted to education. Obviously, the disutility resulting from an increase in schooling 
time is less than the extra utility derived from the increase in lifetime income resulting 
from this increase in e. 
    On the contrary, the optimal level of expenditure (eq.14a) change over time and 
more importantly it carries recursive dynamics.  
 
 
Effects on growth 
    At this point we are able to examine the effects of the social security tax on the 
long-run growth of the economy. Let us first define the stationary or balanced growth 
path (BGP) which will characterize the long-run growth rate of our economy. 
 
 
 
)14()1(
)14(qr)]1()1[(
1,12,2
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Definition 2 
Consider a path ∞=021 },,,{ ttttt ccqe  that satisfies equations (13a,14a,b,c). It is a 
balanced growth path (BGP) if the growth rates of  ttt ccq 21 ,,  equal to the growth rate 
of the human capital stock tH  and the growth rate of schooling time is zero. In other 
words, the variables t
t
t
t
t
t
t e
H
c
H
c
H
q
,,,
21
 are stationary on a BGP.     ■ 
 
Note that in this case the growth rate of schooling time is zero in every period because 
it is a stationary allocation. (eq.(13a)) 
Economy’s growth rate in period t is given by the following expression: 
 
t
t
t
t
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t
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11
1    (15a) 
 
In order to derive the balanced growth rate in a more tractable way we follow De la 
Croix and Michel (2007) and we define the debt-to-income ratio zt3. This ratio shows 
the degree of development of the financial markets.4 It can also be considered as a 
transformed capital-to-labor ratio since education expenditure q is the physical capital 
(resources) that agents invest and H is the efficient labor.  We define it as: 
 
t
t
t AH
q
z =    (16) 
 
Hence, the growth rate in eq.(15a) is transformed as: 
tt
t
t
t zeAvH
H
φγ +== ++
1
1     (15b) 
 
Now dividing equation (14a) with A tH  and substituting equations (15b) and (16) in 
(14a) we take: 
                                                 
3
 We define the ratio in terms of current income because agents do not have income when young. 
4
 Azariadis, Kaas (2004). 
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The above first-order difference equation characterizes the dynamic behavior of 
tt AHq in time, which in turn dictates the dynamic behavior of the growth rate 1+tγ  
according to eq.(15b). The dynamic behavior of debt-to-income ratio and growth 
results from the intergenerational links that the unfunded pension system generates; 
that is, social security benefits depend on next generation’s income. 
 
First, note that in order for zt+1 to be always positive (q and H take only positive 
values) zt must be confined to values higher than )(
)(
τ
τ
B
C
 if B(τ) > 0 or lower than 
)(
)(
τ
τ
B
C
 if B(τ) < 0. However, the latter restriction cannot hold true since it implies that 
zt is negative. Hence, we restrict to the former constraint and we also assume from 
now on that B(τ) is always positive. This assumption confines the parameters to take 
certain values. 
 
In order to derive the balanced growth path we have to estimate the steady state of  
zt+1=f(zt)  setting zt+1=zt=z . We obtain two steady-state values for z: 
 
[ ]
τ
φτ
)1)(1(
n)1(ττ))-(1A-rτ)(1-(1)1(*
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++
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where [ ] [ ] 32 )1()()1()1)(1()1()1(2 τφτττφ −−++−+⋅+−−= AvnrrAD  
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Lemma 1.(Existence and uniqueness of steady state)  
If [ ] [ ] 0)1()()1()1)(1()1()1(2 32 =−−++−+⋅+−− τφτττφ AvnrrA for ]1,0[∈τ  then an 
equilibrium z* exists and is unique.  
Proof.  It is straightforward from eq.(17b).  ■ 
 
If the discriminant D is positive, two discrete steady states will exist. However, both 
steady states are either positive or negative depending on the sign of the bracket  
[ n)1(ττ))-(1A-rτ)(1-(1 +++ vφ ] 
 
Lemma 2. Assume that  
          n)1(ττ))-(1A-rτ)(1-(1 +++ vφ  < 0 ;  
then the steady state values for z are positive. 
Proof. See Appendix A. ■ 
 
Notice that the condition in Lemma 2 also guarantees that B(τ) will always be 
positive. 
Multiplicity of equilibria in unconstrained economies is not common in literature. 
However, here it is the nature of the unfunded pension system (the intergenerational 
dynamics) that generates the multiplicity.  
We are going to approach the form that the difference equation (17a) has in the space 
of z. In appendix A it is proved that zt+1=f(zt) is an increasing and concave hyperbole 
having asymptotes other than the axes.  
 
 
Fig.1  The two steady states of the unconstrained economy 
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    We can easily verify from figure 1 that *1z is unstable and *2z  asymptotically stable 
equilibrium. For *1z  there is local determinacy, that is any solution other than  *1z  
generates a trajectory that monotonically diverges from the steady state. In other 
words, there is a unique initial condition z(0)= *1z  that leads to the equilibrium *1z . On 
the other hand, *2z  is locally indeterminate, that is a continuum of initial conditions 
z(0) around *2z  that generate trajectories converging to the equilibrium *2z . Hence, we 
conclude that global indeterminacy for z(t) and thus for the BGP exists. This result 
arises simply from the multiplicity of steady-state equilibria regardless of the stability 
properties of these equilibria. However, as z is a jump (non-predetermined) variable 
there are no transitional dynamics. The variable z jumps immediately in a unique way 
to take its long-run value and stay there until the system is disturbed in some way. Put 
it differently, given the initial human capital stock H(0), the choice of investment in 
education q immediately adjusts to keep the debt-to-income ratio constant over time 
ensuring a balanced growth path.  
    Now we are ready to examine the effects of a change in tax on the balanced growth 
rate. We have two balanced growth rates depending on the level of debt-to-income 
ratio z that the economy will balance. If the economy is balanced with a low value for 
debt-to-income ratio *1z , then it will experience low long-run growth. If the economy 
is balanced with a high debt-to-income ratio *2z , then it will experience high long-run 
growth. Combining eq.(13a), (15b) and (17b) the balanced-growth rate is: 
 
*
2,1
*
2,1 zev
BGP ⋅⋅+= φγ    (18) 
 
However, the parameterized computation of the effects on the growth rate requires 
difficult algebra that cannot give us explicit results. Hence, we are going to examine 
this case through simulation in the next section.  
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4.1.2 Fully funded pension system 
    Making use of eq.(4), (6) and (10) in eq.(13c) we derive the optimal education 
expenditure: 
)(η τ
t
t
AvHq =     (19) 
 
where  η(τ) = )1(
1
2)1(2 rA +
−
−
−−
τ
τ
τφ . 
 
 
Effects on growth 
Using eq.(13a) and (19) we derive the growth rate:  
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Note that, in case of a fully funded social security, there is no recursive behavior of 
the optimal education expenditure and the growth rate is stationary. That is economies 
with fully funded social security exhibit balanced growth forever. According to 
Definition 2, the above result is expected since e is stationary (eq.(13a)) and q and H 
always grow at the same rate (eq.(19)). The effect of a change in the tax rate on the 
growth rate is given by the following differential: 
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The determinant term is the first differential of η(τ): 
0
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Hence, ]1,0[0 ∈∀>
∂
∂
τ
τ
γ BGP
. The growth-maximizing tax rate is the upper bound. 
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Conclusion 1. 
Increases in the tax rate of a fully funded social security benefit growth of an 
unconstrained economy.    ■ 
 
   The increasing growth rate is somewhat expected since it results from the increasing 
in τ time devoted to education eq.(13a) and education expenditure eq.(19). This can 
be explained as follows; an increase in the tax rate enhances social security benefits 
but reduces after-tax income. Hence, agents are induced to increase time devoted to 
education in order to increase after-tax income. Similarly they increase education 
expenditure in order to create more human capital thus attaining higher social security 
benefits. The increase in expenditure q reduces resources for consumption, but also 
enhances human capital production thus increasing future income. Here, increasing q 
leads to a positive net lifetime income.  
 
 
4.2 Exogenous debt constraints 
    When debt constraints bind individuals have to maximize their utility subject to the 
budget constraint and the exogenous debt constraint. Combining the utility function, 
the (BC), eq.(7) and eq.(11) we take the following Lagrange equation: 
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The FOC’s related to the above Lagrange are: 
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Since the rationality constraint binds we directly obtain the optimal education 
expenditure:  
tt AHq θ=    (22a) 
 
Equation (22a) represents the dynamic path of education expenditure over time and, 
given an initial condition for H, investment in education q is always determined by 
the average human capital stock of the same period.  
 
From (21c) and (21d) we take: 
1,12,2 )1( ++ += tt crc   (22b) 
 
With simple substitutions of (22b) in (B.C.) we take an expression for c1,t+1. Then 
setting this expression in (21c) we take a similar expression for λ. Finally, setting 
expression of λ and eq.(22a) in (21a) we derive an expression for et: 
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At this point we can distinguish the solutions of the two social security programs. 
 
 
4.2.1 Unfunded pension system 
    Implementing eq.(5) and then eq.(4) and (10) in (22c) we obtain a first-order 
difference equation that characterizes the optimal path of the time devoted to 
education. 
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    Equation (23) shows the optimal path that schooling time follows, which depends 
negatively on its previous level. We can consider the recursive equation as either 
forward or backward-looking. In fact, it is a forward-looking equation since by 
assumption agents maximize their utility taking their future social security benefits 
into account, which depend on their offspring’s income. However, the causality 
between et+1 and et can be explained in the same way no matter if the agents look in 
the past or in the future since there is no uncertainty in our model. The negative 
relation between et+1 and et can be explained as follows; if the schooling time of 
generation t+1 increases, both their future income and as a result the social security 
benefits of generation t will increase. Taking this implication into account, agents of 
generation t have incentive to cut their time devoted to education since they enjoy 
increased social security benefits, thus increased lifetime income. In other words, the 
increased income induces agents to cut schooling time thus increasing their lifetime 
utility. 
   If we substitute (22a) and (23) in (4) we take the equilibrium path of human capital. 
Making similar substitutions, we take the optimal consumption paths. 
  At this point we should examine the properties of the difference equation (23) in 
order to guarantee an equilibrium (steady-state) solution. First, some restrictions on 
the schooling time apply, which are given below: 
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The first restriction yields that et must lie in the range ),( ee  which is explicitly given 
in appendix B. In other words, out of this range e is restricted to take the corner values 
(0 and 1).  The second restriction yields a lower bound for the exogenous borrowing 
limit θ. That is  
r1A2 ++
=>
φ
θθ
v
   (24) 
 
Dropping time indexes in equation (23) we obtain the steady-state level of time 
devoted to education, which is:  
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where [ ])τ)(A-2(1r)(1n)(14)1)(1(9 2 vrD +++++−+= φθθττ  
 
Lemma 3. 
Under an unfunded pension rule and with binding exogenous constraints, a steady 
state for time devoted to education exists and is unique.  
Proof. In equation (25) the discriminant D is strictly positive for any ]1,0[∈τ  .    ■ 
 
    We have disregarded the second root of e since it is negative and will never be 
reached. In addition, it is computed that eˆ is a decreasing function of θ. This can be 
explained as follows; a decline in θ depresses education expenditure and agents 
increase time for education in order to preserve their human capital (income) at the 
initial level.  
    For stability of the steady state we should check )ˆ(ef ′ . In order to be lower than 
one in absolute value, computations yield that the following inequality must hold: 
 
0τ))-(12Ar(1)1(2 <+++− φθτv  
 
Obviously this inequality does not hold for [ ]1,0∈τ  thus the steady state is unstable 
for any values of the parameters. 
 
1|)ˆ(| >′ ef  
 
 However, since e is a control (non-predetermined) variable the economy always 
jumps on the steady state value eˆ . Hence, the equilibrium is globally determinate 
since there is a unique value e(0)= eˆ  that leads the economy to equilibrium. Any 
other value of e generates trajectories that diverge from eˆ . 
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Effects on growth 
Substituting equation (22a) in (15a), the growth rate each period equals  
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According to Definition 2, our economy is on a balanced growth path if e takes its 
steady-state value. Note that the BGP is globally determinate since the equilibrium of 
e is globally determinate. 
eˆAφθγ += vBGP    (26) 
 
The balanced growth rate will move to the same direction as the steady state of e 
corresponding to changes in the tax rate. 
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The differential 
τ∂
∂eˆ
 is a second-degree polynomial of θ. Hence the exogenous 
borrowing limit θ is a crucial parameter that determines how time devoted to 
education (thus growth rate) reacts to changes in the tax rate. The critical values for θ 
are: 
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Table 1 shows how θ affects the differential
τ∂
∂eˆ
. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Critical values of the debt-to-income ratio 
 
τ∂
∂eˆ
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Conclusion 2. 
If the debt-to-income ratio θ lies in ]1,(),0[ *2*1 θθ ∪ , where *2,1θ  are given by eq.(27), 
increases in the tax rate of an unfunded pension scheme harm long-run growth. On 
the other hand, for borrowing limits that lie in ),( *2*1 θθ  increases in the tax rate 
benefit growth.    ■ 
 
    Conclusion 2 confirms theory stating that the efficiency (here not only quantitative 
but also qualitative results) of a social security tax depends crucially on the tightness 
of the borrowing constraints. The ambiguity of the sign of  
τ∂
∂eˆ
  results from two 
opposite forces explained below. When θ is high (> *2θ ) education expenditure q of 
generation t is also high thus offspring’s (generation t+1) income exceeds 
generation’s t income. Assuming unfunded social security, this means that an increase 
in the tax rate increases lifetime income5. Hence individuals have incentive to lower 
time devoted to education. For lower ),( *2*1 θθθ ∈ , the opposite holds; an increase of 
tax rate reduces lifetime income thus inducing agents to increase time for education. 
Note that increases in time for education bear a cost in term of reduced utility and a 
benefit in terms of increased income. In the cases discussed above θ is sufficiently 
high (equally e is sufficiently low) to ensure that the benefit prevails the cost of an 
increase in e6. However, for very low θ (< *1θ ), time devoted to education is very high. 
This means that for subsequent increases in education time the utility cost prevails 
over the income benefits due to the concavity of the utility with respect to schooling 
time. Hence, for low θ an increase in the tax rate will finally make agents cut time 
devoted to education. 
    Although results crucially depend on θ, at least the model can ensure that for a 
given θ the growth rate will behave in a monotonic way with respect to the tax rate. 
This means that there is no interior growth-maximizing tax rate. For 
]1,(),0[ *2*1 θθθ ∪∈  the growth-maximizing tax rate is zero, while for ),( *2*1 θθθ ∈  it 
equals to 1. The above results hold only if the exogenous constraint binds for any τ. 
                                                 
5
 21 )1( ++ +< tt AhnAh ττ  
6
 We discussed before that e is a decreasing function of θ. In addition, the utility is a decreasing and 
concave function of e. 
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We will see in the simulation section that this result may not be guaranteed since the 
constraint is not always binding. 
 
 
4.2.2 Fully funded pension system 
Implementing eq.(6) and then eq.(4) and (10) in (22c) we obtain the optimal time 
devoted to education which is stationary: 
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It is easily derived that e increases with higher θ: 
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Effects on growth 
Substituting equation (22a) and (28a) in (15a), the growth rate each period equals  
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which is stationary. Hence, again the economy under fully funded social security is 
always on the balanced growth path. It is trivially concluded that tighter borrowing 
constraints (lower θ) harm growth: 
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The above result is expected since according to eq.(22a) and (28b), q and e move to 
the same direction as θ. Hence, if θ decreases, time and resources for education 
decrease thus causing growth rate to fall. This result confirms De Gregorio (1996). 
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The effect of a change in the tax rate on growth is given by the differential: 
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Lemma 4. (Sufficient condition) 
If rA +> 1φ , then increasing social security contributions harm growth. 
Proof. It is straightforward from the differential (29b).   ■ 
 
 
We already know from the unconstrained case that a condition that guarantees et<1 is 
rA +>− 1)1( φτ .7 Hence, if we want to be consistent with the parameter restrictions 
throughout all the cases we study, the sufficient condition in Lemma 4 should hold. 
 
An alternative way would be to set θ as the crucial parameter for determining the sign 
of 
τ
γ
∂
∂
. More specifically, three formal cases arise, given in Conclusion 3. 
 
Conclusion 3. 
Under a fully funded pension rule, the response of the growth rate to changes in the 
tax rate is described in the next table. 
1+r < Aφ θ∀
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ν > 1+r-Aφ θ∀
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γ
 
1+r > Aφ 
ν < 1+r-Aφ 
ϕ
θ
A-r1
v
+
>  0>
∂
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τ
γ
 
         ■ 
 
However, the last two cases may not be realistic since, according to real data, the 
marginal factor productivities (A, φ) are much greater than 1 while the interest rate 
ranges in low levels.  Hence, there is strong evidence that social security tax harms 
growth. 
                                                 
7
 See eq.(13a) 
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4.3 Endogenous debt constraints 
    In an economy with endogenous debt constraints, individuals maximize their utility 
subject to the lifetime budget constraint (B.C.) and the two rationality constraints (8), 
(9). Thus combining the equations above with eq.(11) we obtain: 
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The FOC’s related to the Lagrange equation are: 
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    Intuitively, the case that both rationality constraints (8), (9) bind results to zero 
optimal education expenditure. If the constraint (9), which implies non-negative 
savings, binds, it means that agents find it optimal either to consume under autarky or 
to borrow when middle-aged due to excessive resources in old age. However, in both 
cases they result living under autarky thus making no savings.  
22,21,2 0 +++ =⇒= ttt bcs    (31a) 
 
    This means that creditors cannot impose any penalty in case of default in the 
second period, since the only penalty they could use is the garnishment of future 
savings. Hence, individuals always find it optimal to default and creditors will never 
lend them.  
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    We can also verify this result using algebra and the result is the same no matter 
which social security program applies. Setting eq.(31a)
 
in eq.(30d) we solve for λ in 
terms of bt+2, µ1, µ2. Then substituting it in (30c) we take an expression for c1,t+1 and 
then substituting it with (31a) in the (B.C.) we take: 
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Also substituting c1,t+1  and c2,t+2  in the binding constraint (8) with the expressions we 
found above, we have: 
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It is straightforward from eq.(31b) and (31c) that qt=0. In this trivial case, the 
economy will contract (poverty trap) since there will be no formation of new human 
capital, depending only on the human capital of the previous generations. The net 
growth rate will be v-1 < 0 or equally the gross growth rate: 
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We are now going to examine the most intricate case in which only constraint (8) 
binds. Again we are going to distinguish two solutions, one for each social security 
program. 
 
 
4.3.1 Unfunded pension system 
We have µ2=0 and st >0. Also from (30c) and (30d) we take 
a)32()1( 1,12,2 ++ += tt crc  
 
Substituting (31a), (30c) and (5) in (8) we take 
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Similarly setting (31a), (30c) and (5) in the (B.C.) 
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In order to make the system of equations more tractable we define a new variable as:  
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Substituting eq.(33a), (33b), (33c) in (30a), (30b), (32b) and (32c) we obtain the 
following system of equations: 
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Solving (34a) and (34b) for λ and µ and substituting them in (34c) and (34d) we 
derive two equations in terms of et, xt+1, xt. Solving them for et  and equating, they 
yield a first-order difference equation. Then substituting xt+1=xt=x, we derive an 
expression in terms of the steady state x: 
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    At this point we should note that equation (35) as a polynomial yields multiple 
solutions for x (thus for q). The multiplicity of equilibria emerges due to the 
intergenerational dynamics resulted from the nature of the unfunded pension system 
as mentioned in section 4.1.1. It is known that multiplicity of equilibria may also 
result from non-convexities of the constraint set of the optimization problem. This 
source of multiplicity is called endogenous heterogeneity8. This means that certain 
values of the tax rate are consistent with more than one optimal choice of q, thus ex 
ante identical agents can exhibit ex post heterogeneity. For instance, Andolfatto and 
Gervais (2006) show that some levels of policy intervention can generate one low and 
one high optimal level of human capital investment. These two equilibria can equally 
be selected by agents since they yield the same level of utility.  
    According to Andolfatto and Gervais (2006), non-convexities would arise if for any 
level of tax rate there was a non-negative level of optimal investment, say )(ˆ τq , that 
is consistent with the act of default. The restriction that the optimal investment cannot 
lie in the neighborhood of )(ˆ τq cuts a path through the set of feasible human capital 
investment allocations, leaving the constraint set non-convex.  
    When q=0 and e>0 there is always a level of tax rate τ~ that results to perfect 
consumption smoothing for a defaulter. That is: 
1)1(
1
~)~()~( 21 ++=⇒= vncc
DD τττ  
Obviously, at ττ ~= and q=0 the act of non-default and default yield the same level of 
utility, thus non-default is expected. If q increases, net income (thus utility) of a 
defaulter is always greater than that of a non-defaulter since the non-defaulter has to 
pay off the loan. Hence, at ττ ~= for any q>0 there is incentive to default. For 
ττ ~> perfect consumption smoothing can no longer be attained for a defaulter since 
more resources are transferred to the retirement age.  Hence, for ττ ~> and q=0 the act 
of default yields lower utility than that of non-default. As q increases a defaulter gains 
in terms of income and future social security benefits, since investment enhances not 
only her own income but also average human capital thus their offspring’s income. 
This is the crucial difference between a model with lump-sum social security tax (like 
in Andolfatto, Gervais (2006)) and a labor income tax assumed in our model. With 
lump-sum tax an increase in investment q enhances second-period income thus the 
                                                 
8
 Andolfatto, Gervais (2006) provide long discussion on this topic. 
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second-period consumption and there will be a q>0 such that the defaulter achieves 
perfect consumption smoothing. However, with labor income tax an increase in q of 
generation t enhances second-period income (and second-period consumption) but 
also enhances offspring’s (generation t+1) income thus increasing generation’s t 
social security benefits (and their third-period consumption)9. The fact that both 
second and third-period consumptions increase cannot ensure perfect consumption 
smoothing for a q>0. In this case, a positive )(ˆ τq  will be desirable for a defaulter 
only if second-period consumption grows at a greater rate than third-period 
consumption such that at )(ˆ τq the two consumption allocations become equal. That is 
q
c
q
c DD
∂
∂
>
∂
∂ 21
.  However, for very high q, Dc1 exceeds Dc2  and the act of default becomes  
again costly. Hence, there is a neighborhood of finite )(ˆ τq that features default and 
these )(ˆ τq will never be reached. On the other hand, if 
q
c
q
c DD
∂
∂
≤
∂
∂ 21 , for any q>0 
Dc2 always exceeds Dc1  and as q increases the consumption smoothing even more 
deteriorates.  
    Now considering non-default, as the investment q increases, a non-defaulter gains 
in terms of future income but less than a defaulter since she pays off the debt.  
    To sum up, for ττ ~>  and q>0 the act of default may bear a cost in terms of 
consumption smoothing and the act of non-default bears a cost in terms of loan 
repayment. There will be a )(ˆ τq >0 that features default only if the utility upon 
default increases/declines at a higher/lower rate than the utility upon non-default. That 
is: 
t
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q
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The explanation and the results when ττ ~< are similar to the above discussion. 
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Conclusion 4. 
In an economy with unfunded social security and endogenous debt constraints 
endogenous heterogeneity (multiple equilibria) will not emerge iff  
q
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Effects on growth 
The growth rate in terms of x is: 
 
t
t
1
e
xv
H
q
v
t
t
t ⋅+=+=+ φφγ   
Thus, from Definition 2, the balanced growth rate is derived when the variable xt takes 
its steady state value: 
xv
H
q
v
t
tBGP ⋅+=+= φφγ t
e
   (36) 
 
However, the expression with x that we derive above is a high-degree polynomial 
that, when solved explicitly, yields complicate expressions making it hard to do 
qualitative analysis. We will examine the effects of the tax rate on the equilibrium 
through numerical analysis in the next section. Indeed, we are going to show that the 
results are ambiguous due to the emergence of multiple equilibria. However, these 
equilibria may arise as a result of the polynomial form of eq.(35) and not only due to 
endogenous heterogeneity.   
 
 
4.3.2 Fully funded pension system 
We have µ2=0 and st >0. Also from (30c) and (30d) we take 
a)37()1( 1,12,2 ++ += tt crc  
 
Substituting (31a), (30c) and (6) in (8) we take 
)37()h1()1()1( 2 1t22
2
1
2
bAr t +−=
++
ττ
λ
µ
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Similarly setting (31a), (30c) and (6) in the (B.C.) 
)37(
1
Ah12 1t1 cq
r
t
t −
+
=
+ +
λ
µ
 
 
Equations (30a), (30b), (37b) and (37c) are a system that contains four variables (λt, 
µ1t, et, qt). Solving the system we derive explicit expressions for et and qt. The optimal 
allocation of time devoted to education is stationary: 
 
t
A
rA
et ∀−−
+−−−
= ))1((
)1())1(21(
τττφ
ττφ
   (38a) 
 
On the other hand, the optimal education expenditures are a function of the average 
human capital: 
 
( )( )
( ) ( ))1()1(4)1(31)1(
)1()1(21
ττττφφτττ
τττττ
−−−−−−−++
−−−−
=
AAr
AvH
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    As before, we should note that there is possibility of multiple equilibria. If this is 
the case, they will result from non-convexities of the constraint set. The explanation is 
similar to that in the previous section. When q=0 and e>0 there is always a level of 
tax rate τ~ that results to perfect consumption smoothing for a defaulter. That is: 
r
cc DD
+
=⇒=
2
1
~)~()~( 21 τττ  
Obviously, at ττ ~= and q=0 the act of non-default and default yield the same level of 
utility, thus non-default is expected. If q increases net income (thus utility) of a 
defaulter is always greater than that of a non-defaulter since the non-defaulter has to 
pay off the loan. Hence, at ττ ~= for any q>0 there is incentive to default. For 
ττ ~> perfect consumption smoothing can no longer be attained for a defaulter since 
more resources are transferred to the retirement age.  Hence, for ττ ~> and q=0 the act 
of default yields lower utility than that of non-default. As q increases a defaulter gains 
in terms of income and future social security benefits. As mentioned before, with 
lump-sum tax an increase in investment q enhances second-period income thus the 
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second-period consumption and there will be a q>0 such that the defaulter achieves 
perfect consumption smoothing. However, with labor income tax an increase in q 
enhances second-period income thus increasing both the second-period and third-
period consumption. The third-period consumption increases because income directly 
affects social security benefits under a fully funded system10. The fact that both 
second and third-period consumptions increase cannot ensure perfect consumption 
smoothing for a q>0. In this case, a positive )(ˆ τq  will be desirable for a defaulter 
only if second-period consumption grows at a greater rate than third-period 
consumption such that at )(ˆ τq the two consumption allocations become equal. That 
is: 
r
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2
1
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τ
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which does not hold since by assumption 
r+
=>
2
1
~ττ . Hence, for any q>0 
Dc2 always exceeds Dc1  and as q increases the consumption smoothing even more 
deteriorates.  
    On the other hand, as the investment q increases, a non-defaulter gains in terms of 
future income but less than a defaulter since she pays off the debt.  
    To sum up, for ττ ~>  and q>0 the act of default bears a cost in terms of 
consumption smoothing and the act of non-default bears a cost in terms of loan 
repayment. There will be a )(ˆ τq >0 that features default only if the utility upon 
default increases/declines at a higher/lower rate than the utility upon non-default. That 
is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The explanation and the results when ττ ~< are similar to the above discussion. 
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Conclusion 5. 
In an economy with fully funded social security and endogenous debt constraints 
endogenous heterogeneity (multiple equilibria) will not emerge iff  
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Effects on growth 
The growth rate is stationary, that is the fully funded social security ensures balanced 
growth in every period (Definition 2): 
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We are going to see in the next section which is the relation between the tax rate and 
the growth rate since this expression does not generate explicit results. 
 42 
5. Simulation 
Simulation is done in order to derive more explicit results for cases that theory cannot 
yield. Hence, we do not focus so much on quantitative results but rather on qualitative 
results, since we concern for the general pattern that each case generates. In section 
5.1 we calibrate the model according to data from U.S.A. in order to approach each 
case as much as possible.  
 
5.1 Calibrating the model 
The model’s parameters are those that describe final product’s technology (A), human 
capital production  (v,φ), the population growth rate (n), the real interest rate (r), the 
debt-to-income ratio (θ) and the tax rate (τ). 
Individuals live for three periods, so we consider that each period lasts 20 years of 
adult life. Following Hubbard and Judd (1987) the population grows at a rate of 1% 
per annum or %22%100)101.1( 20 =⋅−  per period. We also assume an annual interest 
rate equal to 4% or 19.1104.1 20 =− per period.  
The unsecured debt to disposable income ratio over the 1995-1999 period for USA 
was 8.4% according to Livshits et al. (2007). Since disposable income over the same 
period was 72.7% of GDP, the debt-to-income ratio is 6.1%.11  
Finally, according to the data of National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 
adults devote 3.1 hours per weekday on average12, so we assign a steady-state value 
for time devoted to education equal to 0.13.  
The other variables (v, φ, A) are computed such that, with an unfunded social security 
tax τ=0.09, young face binding exogenous constraints in the steady state. Table 3 
contains the values of the calibrated model. 
 
Parameter values Target data 
A = 3 e = 0.13 
v = 0.82 θ = 0.061 
φ = 2.4 r = 1.19 
 n = 0.22 
                                                 
11
 Andolfatto, Gervais (2008) 
12
  Data include individuals, ages 15 to 49, who were enrolled full time at a university or college. Data 
include non-holiday weekdays and are averages for 2003-07. 
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5.2 Unfunded social security and growth 
In this section we are ready to directly compare unconstrained and constrained cases 
and find whether a maximum growth rate can be attained.  
 
 
5.2.1 Unconstrained economy 
    According to section 4.1.1, two steady state values for z arise. Hence, there are two 
balanced growth paths and we can explore their characteristics. Substituting the 
benchmark parameters in eq.(18) we take the following figures that depict the 
balanced growth rate as function of the social security tax.13 
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Fig.2  The unconstrained balanced growth as a function of the social security tax  
(Left: low steady state *1z , right: high steady state
*
2z ) 
 
    The two steady states generate opposite results regarding the response of the 
balanced growth rate to changes in the social security tax rate. The growth patterns 
depicted above are the same as the respective patterns of debt-to-income ratios. The 
left figure features the low steady state *1z  (negative root of eq.17b) and confirms 
studies concluding that increasing tax induces people to invest more in human capital 
thus enhancing long-run growth. On the other hand, the right figure stands for the 
high steady state *2z  (positive root of eq.17b) and shows that the growth rate will 
decline if the tax rate increases. Two opposite forces, which determine the net lifetime 
                                                 
13
 We must ensure the existence and non-negativity of the steady state z. According to the assumptions 
of Lemmas 1 and 2, steady-state values for z exist and are positive for tax rates lower than a maxτ (here 
0.4), so we confine to this range of tax rates. 
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income, drive optimal education expenditure (thus z) when tax rate increases; the 
decline in after-tax income encourages investment in education and the increased 
social security benefits induce agents to cut education expenditure. When education 
expenditure q is low the former effect dominates the latter and when q is high the 
opposite holds. 
    More interestingly, the low equilibrium debt-to-income ratio yields low long-run 
growth while the high equilibrium ratio drives economy to a high-growth path.14 This 
means that there will be “convergence clubs” of economies15; those which have a very 
low initial level of debt-to-income ratio will experience low long-run growth while 
those initially with high debt-to-income ratios will balance on a high-growth path. 
 
 
5.2.2 Exogenous debt constraints 
    Firstly, we must ensure that the optimal choice of time devoted to education will be 
non-negative. The lower bound of debt-to-income ratio θ (eq.24) that guarantees the 
above assumption is:  
0.06θ θ> =  
In addition, the steady-state values for the time spent on education must lie between 
[0,1]. Αpplying the calibrated parameters to eq.(25), the steady-state value for e is 
proved to be in the above range for any  θ θ>  and for any )4.0(max =< ττ . 
 
According to the theoretical part, when exogenous debt constraints bind, there are two 
critical values for θ that determine the relation between tax rate and growth (table 1). 
We recall it below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Critical values of the debt-to-income ratio 
 
                                                 
14
 We should remark that the characterizations “low” and “high” used in this section may be 
misleading. They are used only for discriminating the two equilibria when referring to them. In fact, the 
first equilibrium features from null to high growth and the second equilibrium features extremely high 
growth.  
 
15
 The term is borrowed from Azariadis, Kaas (2004). 
τ∂
∂eˆ
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    The above rule with respect to the debt-to-income ratio applies only when the 
exogenous constraint binds. However, not for all tax rates the constraint binds. For 
this reason, in order to determine the optimal growth curve as a function of the tax 
rate we should compare the constrained with the unconstrained level of education 
expenditure q. When there is an exogenous constraint the optimal allocation will be 
the one with the lowest value of q.  That is: 
 
{ }qqqt ˆ,min *=    (40a) 
 
where qˆ = θΑΗt.16 
 
We can transform the above decision rule in terms of the auxiliary variable z defined 
before as the debt-to-income ratio 
t
t
t AH
q
z = . Dividing eq.(40a) with AHt we take: 
 
{ }zzzt ˆ,min *=   (40b) 
where zˆ = θ. 
 
Hence, the balanced growth rate under exogenous debt constraints will be given 
according to eq.(18) if * 2,1z < zˆ  and according to eq.(26) if * 2,1z > zˆ . However, since zˆ  
is a function of θ the above comparisons give different results for different values of 
θ. In addition, we should note that θ is a stationary debt-to-income ratio thus it is also 
the value of the initial debt-to-income ratio of period 0, z0. Four cases arise with 
respect to θ and they are depicted in figure 3. Figure 3 shows the debt-to-income ratio 
as a function of the social security tax rate.  
 If 1θθ <  (fig.3(a)), initial *10 zz <  and the economy will balance at the low 
steady state *1z . Comparing the constrained with the unconstrained z, we 
observe that the exogenous constraint binds ( *1z > zˆ ) for any ],0[ maxττ ∈ . Thus 
zˆ  prevails as the equilibrium debt-to-income ratio. 
                                                 
16
 For consistency with the notation we denote unconstrained allocations of q and z with an asterisk (*) 
and constrained allocations with a hat (^).  
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 If ),( 21 θθθ ∈ (fig.3(b)), *20*1 zzz <<  for *ττ <  and *10 zz <  for *ττ > . As a 
result, for *ττ < the economy will balance at the high steady state *2z  since it 
is stable and for *ττ > the economy will balance at the low steady state *1z . 
Hence, we take the equilibrium z will be given according to the following 
rules: 
{ }zzzt ˆ,min *2=   for *ττ <  
{ }zzzt ˆ,min *1=   for *ττ >  
It is obvious that zˆ  prevails in both rules according to figure 3(b).  
 If ),( 32 θθθ ∈ (fig.3(c)), in the initial period *20*1 zzz <<  for any ],0[ maxττ ∈  the 
economy will balance at the high steady state *2z  since it is stable. Comparing 
the constrained with the unconstrained z, we observe that the exogenous 
constraint binds ( *2z > zˆ ) for any ],0[ maxττ ∈ . Thus zˆ  prevails as the 
equilibrium debt-to-income ratio. 
 If 3θθ >  (fig.3(d)), initial *20 zz >  and the economy will balance at the high 
steady state *2z . Comparing the constrained with the unconstrained z, we 
observe that the exogenous constraint binds ( *2z > zˆ ) for ττ ˆ<  and does not 
bind ( *2z < zˆ ) for ττ ˆ> . Hence, the equilibrium debt-to-income ratio will be zˆ  
for ττ ˆ<  and *2z   for ττ ˆ> . 
 
 
(a) 1θθ <  
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(b) ),( 21 θθθ ∈  
 
 
(c)  ),( 32 θθθ ∈  
 
 
(d)  3θθ >  
Fig.3  The equilibrium debt-to-income ratio as a function of the social security tax  
under exogenous debt constraints 
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Recapitulating from all the cases above, we conclude that the equilibrium debt-to-
income ratio equals: 
      for 3θθ <  and τ∀  
          for 3θθ >  and ττ ˆ<  
*
2z         for 3θθ >  and ττ ˆ>  
 
Taking the above results and table 1 into account, we can derive the pattern of the 
balanced growth rate. We discriminate two cases according to the table 1: 
 For *1θθ <  and 
*
2θθ > , the equilibrium growth rate will always be a 
decreasing function of the tax rate. The growth-maximizing tax rate is zero. 
 For ),( *2*1 θθθ ∈  the equilibrium growth rate will be increasing for ττ ˆ<  and 
decreasing function of the tax rate for ττ ˆ> . That is growth will have an 
inverted-U shape and there is an interior maximum growth at ττ ˆ= . 
 
    According to the calibrated parameters the first case arises and maximum growth 
will be attained at θ=1 and 0=τ . At this point maximum growth equals 6.07.  
    Under binding exogenous constraints and for a wide range of values for the 
parameters, it is computed that  
0>
∂
∂
θ
γ BGP
 
This means that economies with undeveloped financial markets (low θ) experience 
low long-run growth while financial deepening (high θ) relates to higher growth. 
    These results support those of De Gregorio (1996) who shows that increasing 
borrowing constraints harm growth. However, we should make two remarks; first, De 
Gregorio’s results come from a general equilibrium framework and secondly that we 
include both time and resources as inputs in the human production process. The latter 
means that an increase in θ encourages agents to borrow more thus boosting human 
capital formation and growth. De Gregorio assumes only time as an input and 
concludes that time for education increases in response to increases in θ. In contrast, 
in our model the response of optimal time devoted to education to increases in θ is 
ambiguous.  
     
zˆ  
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5.2.3 Endogenous debt constraints 
    Applying the benchmark parameters to eq.(35) we derive three steady-state values 
for  the auxiliary variable x. Debt-to-income ratio is trivially derived from eq.(33a) as: 
t
t
t
t
t Ae
x
AH
q
z ==  
    Hence, there are three steady states for z and three discrete balanced growth paths 
as functions of the tax rate which are depicted in figure 4. Figure 4(a) features 
economies with very low initial financial development (low initial debt-to-income 
ratio) thus low equilibrium ratio. In other words, creditors cannot sufficiently ensure 
the repayment of loans and they provide suboptimal level of credit. Figures 4(c) 
features economies starting with very high debt-to-income ratio thus converging to a 
high equilibrium level and experiencing high long-run growth. This means that credit 
markets are well-developed to provide greater amount of credit. Economies with 
intermediate initial debt-to-income ratios may converge to any of the three cases 
depending on the stability of the equilibria.17  However, in general we conclude that 
economies initially with missing financial markets experience low long-run growth 
forever whereas economies with well-developed financial markets will balance at 
high growth. In other words, there is a strong positive relation between financial 
deepening and long-run growth. The result that under endogenous debt constraints 
there are “convergence clubs” of economies was initially drawn by Azariadis and 
Kaas (2004).  
    Furthermore, social security harms growth for economies that balance at high 
growth (equilibria 2zˆ  and 3zˆ ). This result is expected from the nature of the 
rationality constraints; as tax rate increases so do social security benefits thus 
inducing agents to default easier since consumption smoothing improves. The fact 
that agents default easier for higher tax rates makes constraints bind more tightly and 
the debt-to-income ratio falls. In contrast, in economies balanced at the low steady 
state, debt-to-income ratio (and growth) has a hump-shaped pattern in response to the 
tax rate. This pattern seems to be distorted from what rationality constraints dictate 
due to implications of the unfunded pension system. In fact, it can be viewed as U-
shaped pattern starting from tax rate about 0.4 and ending to 1 thus confirming 
                                                 
17
 The difference equation of z was implicitly derived as it is a complicate expression. Thus we cannot 
examine the stability of equilibria. 
 50 
rationality constraints theory. We explain in detail this approximately U pattern in the 
section of the fully funded scheme. 
 
 
Debt-to-income ratio (z)                             Balanced-growth rate 
 
(a) Low equilibrium  1zˆ  
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(b) Medium equilibrium  2zˆ  
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
1
2
3
4
   
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
5
10
15
20
 
 
(c) High equilibrium  3zˆ  
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Fig.4 Debt-to-income rations and balanced-growth rates  
under binding endogenous debt constraints 
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    However, as noted before constraints do not bind for any level of the tax rate. Thus 
when there are constraints the optimal allocation will be the one with the lowest value 
for education expenditure q (or equally z). We also do this task in order to derive the 
growth-maximizing regime.  
    Applying the benchmark parameters to the optimal allocations for z and e we 
obtain three discrete steady-state values for z and e, 3,2,1zˆ  and 3,2,1eˆ .  Six cases arise 
depending on the initial value of z since there are two unconstrained and three 
endogenously constrained steady states for z. Optimal constrained z will be given by 
the following rule: 
{ }
3,2,1
2,1ˆ,min *
=
==
j
izzz jit
 
Table 2 recapitulates the results from comparing unconstrained and constrained z and 
determining the optimal level of debt-to-income ratio (or equally education 
expenditure). Examining for different initial values for z we conclude that one of the 
cases above will never be reached so we exclude it. Cases 1, 3 and 5 will certainly 
arise. Unfortunately, we cannot ensure what happens with cases 2 and 4 since the 
difference equation of z is not tractable and does not allow to examine the stability of 
the constrained equilibria  3,2,1zˆ .  
),0[ 1ττ ∈  1*1 ˆz z>  1zˆzt =  
),[ 21 τττ ∈  1*1 ˆz z<  *1zzt =  
Case 1 
)ˆ,(z 1*1 z  
 ],[ max2 τττ ∈  1*1 ˆz z>  1zˆzt =  
Case 2 
)ˆ,(z 2*1 z  
],0[ maxττ ∈  2*1 ˆz z<  *1zzt =  
Case 3 
)ˆ,(z 1*2 z  
],0[ maxττ ∈  1
*
2 ˆz z>  
 
1zˆzt =  
Case 4 
)ˆ,(z 2*2 z  
],0[ maxττ ∈  2*2 ˆz z>  2zˆzt =  
),0[ 3ττ ∈  3*2 ˆz z>  3zˆzt =  Case 5 
)ˆ,(z 3*2 z  ],[ max3 τττ ∈  3*2 ˆz z<  *2zzt =  
 
Table 2: Optimal z under endogenous debt constraints 
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The five cases of the growth rate as a function of the tax rate are depicted in figure 5. 
Instead of γ which is the notation for growth, we purposely denote the curves with 
their respective z in order to make the match between table 2 and figure 5 more 
obvious.    
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Fig.5 The balanced-growth rate under endogenous debt constraints 
 
       τmax 
    τmax τmax 
3zˆ    
*
2z  
 
           
τmax 
 
 
τ1                       τ2            =τmax  
  
*
1z  
 
          1zˆ  
2zˆ
1zˆ
τ3 
  
*
1z  
 53 
    According to figure 5(a), case 1 results to an inverted-U growth curve consisting of 
the unconstrained curve for tax rates ),[ 21 τττ ∈  and the constrained curve for tax rates 
),0[ 1ττ ∈  and ],[ max2 τττ ∈ . The growth rate is increasing for tax rates lower than τ2 
and decreasing for higher tax rates. Hence, the there is an interior growth-maximizing 
tax rate equal to τ2 (kink point). 
    Case 2, depicted in figure 5(b), generates the unconstrained low level of debt-to-
income ratio *1z , which means that endogenous constraints do not bind for any τ<τmax. 
In other words, the unconstrained q is always lower than the constrained q which 
means that agents will always choose to borrow the optimal unconstrained level. 
Hence, the balanced growth rate is monotonically increasing in the social security tax. 
The growth-maximizing tax rate is the upper limit τmax. 
    Case 3 in figure 5(c) yields a pattern in which the constrained low-level allocation 
1zˆ prevails over the unconstrained high-level allocation *2z  for any τ< τmax. The long-
run growth rate follows an inverted-U route according to the constrained growth curve 
and there is an interior growth-maximizing tax rate. 
    Case 4 generates the constrained intermediate steady state 2zˆ  for which increasing 
social security contributions harm growth. Hence, long-run growth is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the social security tax (figure 5(d)) and the growth-maximizing 
tax rate is zero.  
    Case 5, described in figure 5(e), results to a crooked curve.  Up to τ= τ3 the curve is 
identical to the constrained growth curve corresponding to the high debt-to-income 
ratio 3zˆ . For higher tax rates the curve becomes identical to the unconstrained growth 
curve corresponding to the high debt-to-income ratio *2z . Hence, long-run growth is a 
decreasing function of the tax rate and the growth-maximizing tax rate equals to zero. 
 
Table 3 shows the minimum and maximum growth rates generated by each case using 
the calibrated parameters. 
Case 1 0  (τ=0) 1.37  (τ=0.33) 
Case 2 1  (τ=0) 2.5  (τ=0.4) 
Case 3 0  (τ=0) 1.45  (τ=0.28) 
Case 4 2.69  (τ=0.4) ∞  (τ=0) 
Case 5 3.21  (τ=0.4) ∞  (τ=0) 
 Table 3 
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    According to figure 5 we observe that for economies balanced at high debt-to-
income ratio (equally growth), i.e. cases 4 and 5, social security harms growth. On the 
other hand, economies balanced at the low level of debt-to-income ratio (thus growth) 
benefit from a social security tax.  
 
    Comparing exogenous with endogenous constraints model under the specific 
parameterization we observe that exogenous constraints can generate a long-run 
growth rate 6.07 as the best scenario when θ=1 and τ = 0. However, this case that θ 
and τ take corner values is a very special and rather unrealistic case. On the other 
hand, under endogenous constraints a wide and feasible range of the tax rate can 
guarantee high long-run growth rates for economies with initial well-developed 
financial markets (cases 4 and 5).   
    In general, we observe that exogenous constraints can generate a decreasing or 
inverted-U growth curve depending on the exogenous debt-to-income ratio θ. 
Similarly, endogenous constraints yield an increasing, decreasing or inverted-U 
growth curve depending on the initial value of debt-to-income ratio z. If case 2 does 
not emerge, obviously both constraints setups suggest that too high social security 
contributions harm growth.  
    More interesting results are derived from the comparison between economies with 
perfect financial markets and debt-constrained economies. As discussed before the 
growth-maximizing tax rate for unconstrained economies is zero or τmax depending on 
the “convergence club” that an economy is placed. For low-growth economies a  τmax 
tax rate is appropriate while for high-growth economies social security harms growth. 
On the other hand, in debt-constrained economies a zero or an interior level of tax rate 
turns out to be the most appropriate considering growth.   
    In addition, improvements in financial markets (higher θ) result to higher long-run 
growth when there are exogenous debt constraints. Similarly, with endogenous 
constraints, a financial reform that would lead to perfect credit markets would 
enhance growth (comparison between figures 2 and 4). This result confirms previous 
studies that find a monotonically increasing relation between financial development 
and long-run growth.18 In contrast, De la Croix and Michel (2007) conclude to a 
hump-shaped pattern. 
                                                 
18
 Aghion, Howitt, Mayer-Foulkes (2005) 
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5.3 Fully funded social security and growth 
 
5.3.1 Unconstrained economy 
    Applying the benchmark parameters to eq.(20) we take the growth rate as a 
function of the social security tax, which is depicted in figure 6. 
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Fig.6 The unconstrained balanced-growth rate as 
a function of the social security tax 
 
 
We observe that, with fully funded social security, increasing contributions (tax rate) 
benefit long-run growth.19 This result was expected from the theoretical analysis 
(section 4.1.2).  
 
 
5.3.2 Exogenous debt constraints 
    Conclusion 3 in section 4.2.2 gives a quite clear view of how long-run growth 
reacts to changes in the tax rate. Under this parameterization the sufficient condition 
of Lemma 4 is satisfied, hence the constrained growth rate will certainly be a 
decreasing function of the social security tax.  
    However, as noted before, when there are constraints they do not necessarily bind. 
As a consequence, we are not ex ante certain for the behavior of the equilibrium 
growth rate. More precisely, for some tax rates the constraint may not bind and the 
growth rate will be an increasing function of the tax rate. For other tax rates the 
constraint will bind and the growth rate will have negative slope. Hence, we have to 
                                                 
19
 An unconstrained balanced-growth rate exists for tax rate up to a τmax (here 0.52). Hence, in our 
analysis we are going to confine to this range of tax rates. 
*γ  
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integrate the unconstrained and the constrained growth curves in a diagram and 
determine the optimal route of the growth rate as the tax changes.  
    The optimal allocation will be the one with the lowest value for education 
expenditure q (or equally debt-to-income ratio z): 
{ }zzzt ˆ,min *=  
 
From eq.(19) the unconstrained expenditure is: 
)()(
**
τητη
v
z
AvHq ttt =⇒=  
 
From eq.(22a) the constrained expenditure is: 
θθ =⇒= ttt zAHq ˆˆ  
 
Obviously, θ is a crucial parameter since it affects the qualitative results regarding the 
route of the growth rate. Put it differently, θ determines the intersection point of the 
constrained and unconstrained curve. There are two cases: 
 If θθ ˆ< (here 0.08), *ˆ zz <  for any tax rate and the exogenous constraint will 
always bind. Hence, the growth rate has a decreasing behavior as tax rate 
increases (figure 7(a)) and the maximum growth rate is attained for tax rate 
equal to zero.  
 If θθ ˆ> , for low tax rates the constraint will not bind and for high rates the 
constraint becomes binding. Thus the balanced growth curve is initially 
increasing and then decreasing in tax (figure 7(b)). In this case there is a kink 
point which yields the maximum growth rate.    
 
    The growth-maximizing tax rate will be either zero or interior ],0[ maxττ ∈  
depending on θ. Furthermore, financial deepening (higher θ) results to higher long run 
growth according to figure 7. This result is expected from the theoretical part since 
time and resources devoted to education increase with θ20. However, as θ increases 
above 0.08 the tightness of borrowing constraints does not affect long-run growth for 
some tax rates since the optimal growth curve is identical to the unconstrained curve 
                                                 
20
 See section 4.2.2. 
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which is irrelevant to θ.  It is easily concluded that maximum growth in a constrained 
economy will always be lower than that of an unconstrained economy (compare 
figures 6 and 7). 
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Fig.7  Debt-to-income ratio and balanced-growth rate as functions 
of the social security tax under exogenous constraints 
 
 
According to the calibrated model, maximum growth rate can potentially reach 5.1. 
This is the case when θ=1 and tax rate equals to the interior kink point 0.49 (figure 
7(b)). On the other hand, growth cannot be lower than 0.4 which is the case when θ=0 
and τ=0.52. 
*z  
zˆ  
zˆ  
*z  
γˆ  
*γ  
γˆ  
θˆ  
θˆ
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5.3.3 Endogenous debt constraints 
 
    The pattern that debt-to-income (and growth) follows is consistent with what 
rationality constraints dictate. In order to understand it better in figure 8(a) we present 
the debt-to-income ratio as a function of the tax rate for the whole range of τ. We 
observe that the pattern of debt-to-income ratio in response to tax approaches a U 
shape. For low tax rates (≈0.2) consumption smoothing is bad under autarky (second-
period consumption exceeds third-period consumption) thus inducing agents not to 
default. Similarly for very high tax rates consumption smoothing is bad under autarky 
(third-period consumption exceeds second-period consumption) thus again inducing 
agents not to default. Hence, for low and high levels of the tax rate an effective 
financial market can exist providing high levels of credit. However, for intermediate 
levels of the tax rate consumption smoothing is relatively good under autarky and 
agents have strong incentive to default. The latter make creditors restrict the supply of 
loans. For the above reasons, low and high tax rates feature high debt-to-income ratios 
while intermediate tax rates feature very low debt-to-income ratios thus generating a 
U-shaped pattern. Long-run growth in figure 8(b) follows a similar pattern to the debt-
to-income ratio. 
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Fig.8 (a) Debt-to-income ratio and (b) balanced growth rate 
 as functions of social security tax 
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Applying the benchmark parameters, τ∀> tt zz ˆ
*
 (similar to fig.9(a)). Hence, the 
endogenous constraint binds for every τ and the growth rate is given by the 
constrained growth curve eq.(39) which is depicted in figure 8(b). The growth-
maximizing tax rate is 0.24 where growth maximum equals to 1.4. However, the 
benchmark parameters restrict us to a special case and for this reason we are going to 
consider any case may arise. The unconstrained and constrained z may have four 
different positions presented in figure 9.  
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Fig.9   Debt-to-income ratios as functions 
of the social security tax under endogenous constraints 
 
    According to the above cases, growth may have a monotonically increasing pattern, 
an inverted-U pattern or the shape of the constrained growth curve (fig.8(b)) 
depending on the position of τmax (i.e. the ending point of z* curve). This means that 
maximum growth can be attained at either τˆ  (low peak) or τmax. Furthermore, a 
financial reform that would lead to perfect financial markets would enhance growth 
(comparison between figures 6 and 8(b)). 
 
 
 
  zˆ  zˆ  *z  
*z  
 zˆ  
  zˆ  *z  
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    The comparison between the unconstrained and the constrained cases under 
fully funded system is now straightforward. Increasing social security contributions 
benefit growth when young individuals are unconstrained while they harm growth 
when there are binding exogenous debt constraints. Finally, with binding endogenous 
constraints, very high and low tax rates benefit growth since credit markets operate 
effectively but intermediate levels of tax rate harm growth (according to the U shape).  
    Furthermore, the growth-maximizing regime for an unconstrained economy is a tax 
rate equal to the τmax. In an economy with exogenous debt constraints, maximum 
growth is attained at zero or an interior ],0[ maxττ ∈  tax rate depending on the 
financial development. Higher degree of financial deepening requires greater social 
security contributions. For endogenously constrained economies the growth-
maximizing tax rate is either τˆ  (low peak) or τmax but not zero. In other words, under 
endogenous constraints the introduction of social security always benefits growth 
while this is not the case when there are exogenous constraints. 
    According to the calibrated model, the growth-maximizing regime for an 
unconstrained economy is a tax rate equal to 0.52, for an exogenously constrained 
economy the tax rate equals to 0.49 and for endogenously constrained economy 
τ=0.24. That is, targeting high long-run growth, exogenous constraints setup requires 
a higher degree of government intervention. However, more active intervention is 
sometimes unattractive regarding welfare implications (Hubbard, Judd (1987)). In 
addition, it is computed that with exogenous constraints long-run growth ranges from 
0.4 to 5.1, while with endogenous constraints growth ranges from 0 to 1.4. Hence, 
endogenous constraints, though more realistic and appropriate to model constraints 
when there is a government policy, generate more conservative results than 
exogenous constraints regarding economy’s growth potential. Table 4 recapitulates 
the minimum and maximum values of the growth rate under a fully funded pension 
system using the benchmark parameters. 
 
 Minimum growth Maximum growth 
No constraints 1  (τ=0) ∞  (τ=0.52) 
Exogenous debt constraints 0.4  (τ=0.52, θ=0) 5.1  (τ=0.49, θ=1) 
Endogenous debt constraints 0  (τ=0) 1.4  (τ=0.24) 
Table 4 
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5.4 Comparison between social security programs 
 
    An additional task is to directly compare the two social security schemes and 
examine their relative efficiency on the long-run growth.  
    Let us take first the unconstrained economy. As noted before, the unfunded 
(PAYG) program yields two equilibria, one characterized by low debt-to-income ratio 
and low growth and the other characterized by high debt-to-income ratio and high 
growth. On the other hand, the fully funded program results to a unique equilibrium 
featuring low growth. This means that the intergenerational dynamics of the unfunded 
pension system will generate two convergence groups of economies depending on 
their initial debt-to-income capital while the absence of intergenerational links in a 
fully funded system will lead to the long-run convergence of all economies. 
Furthermore, an unfunded social security tax always benefit growth while unfunded 
social security may benefit or harm growth depending on the initial situation of an 
economy; economies with low initial debt benefit from unfunded social security while 
economies initially with high debt-to-income ratios are harmed. Thus for economies 
with large amount of credit (high z), the choice of growth regime is crucially 
depended on the social security scheme and should be carefully chosen. 
    If there are exogenous debt constraints, both social security programs expect 
either a decreasing or an inverted U-shaped response of the equilibrium growth rate to 
changes in the tax. Specifically, economies with highly developed financial markets 
will have an interior growth-maximizing tax rate while financially under-developed 
(highly constrained) economies will experience maximum growth at zero tax.  
    Finally, endogenous constraints combined with unfunded public pensions 
generate a monotonically increasing, decreasing or inverted U-shaped growth rate 
depending on the initial financial development of an economy. For highly developed 
economies a zero tax is appropriate while for under-developed economies an interior 
tax is the best regime. On the other hand, the fully funded pension system generates 
an increasing, inverted-U or an approximately U (fig.8(b)) growth pattern. This means 
that social security always benefits growth imposing either an interior or τmax tax rate 
no matter the degree of the initial financial development. Obviously, similar to 
unconstrained economies, the choice of social security program should be more 
careful for highly financially developed economies since the two programs yield 
different growth regimes.     
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6. Conclusion 
 
    In this thesis we examine the effects of social security on long-run growth in debt-
constrained economies.  
    Assuming unfunded social security, multiple equilibria (convergence groups of 
economies) emerge due to the intergenerational dynamics arisen from the nature of 
the unfunded system. An unconstrained economy with unfunded social security has 
two equilibria, one featuring low growth and one very high growth. Economies 
balanced at the low growth benefit from the introduction of social security while for 
economies with high equilibrium growth social security harms growth. When there 
are binding exogenous debt constraints the effects crucially depend on financial 
deepening (debt-to-income ratio); high financial development requires high social 
security contributions while economies with under-developed financial markets may 
get harmed from social security. Endogenous constraints result to multiple equilibria 
thus not giving a clear view of tax effects on growth. However, it is certain that, 
targeting maximum growth with endogenous constraints, initial financial deepening 
relates negatively to the social security burden. 
    Assuming fully funded pension system we derive more explicit results. Specifically, 
in an unconstrained economy increasing social security contributions always benefit 
growth, while with binding exogenous constraints social security contributions benefit 
growth up to a point depending on the degree of financial deepening (debt-to-income 
ratio). If debt constraints become endogenous, fully funded social security always 
benefits growth.   
     Finally, employing any constraint setup and social security scheme, financial 
deepening benefits long-run growth.  
    The scope of this thesis is confined to partial equilibrium effects assuming a small 
open economy with constant interest rate. Letting interest rate to be endogenously 
determined by the equilibrium conditions in the assets market, implications of social 
security on growth become more complicate. De la Croix and Michel (2007) study the 
effects of debt constraints on growth in a general equilibrium framework using the 
interest rate as the key variable. Similarly, analyzing the general equilibrium effects of 
a social security policy may yield different results from those drawn in this thesis thus 
giving rise to future research.
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Appendix A 
 
 
 Proof of Lemma 2. 
 
Firstly, it is straightforward that if the bracket 
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The negative root of z will also be positive if  
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Making some algebraic operations we conclude to the following inequality: 
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which always holds true. Hence, the negative root of z has positive value.  ■ 
 
 
 Stability analysis of the difference equation (17a). 
 
One way of checking for stability would be computing the differential )(' *zf . 
However, it yields an expression with many parameters without an explicit result. For 
this reason, we do stability analysis approaching the graph of eq.(17a).    
 
The function zt+1=f(zt) is continuous in R+ since the first differential  
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is well-defined for any +∈ Rz . 
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 Since both sides of the inequality are positive (Lemma’s assumption) we can square them. 
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The function zt+1=f(zt) is monotonically increasing in R+  iff +∈∀> Rzzf t 0)(' . 
Making some algebraic operations in the above inequality we conclude to the 
following expression: 
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which always holds true since B(τ), C(τ) > 0. 
 
The graph intersects the vertical axis at the point: 
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The function zt+1=f(zt) is concave in R+  iff +∈∀< Rzzf t 0)('' . Making some 
algebraic operations in the above inequality we conclude to the following expression: 
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